Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/28 : CIA-RDP80S01540R006600090043-9

50X1-HUM

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

50X1-HUM

COUNTRY Yugoslavia/USSR

SUBJECT Yugoslav-Soviet Meeting

DATE OF INFO.

PLACE ACQUIRED

DATE ACQUIRED

REPORT

DATE DISTR. 6 June 1955

NO. OF PAGES 4

REQUIREMENT NO. RD

REFERENCES

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

BY CABLE

50X1-HUM

1. The USSR proposed in December 1954 that Tito visit Moscow, but he rejected the idea and in January Tito proposed that the Russians visit Belgrade. The latter accepted this invitation with the stipulation that Belgrade rid itself of the last vestiges of Djilasism. This is the reason that the Federation of Communists of Yugoslavia attacked Dedijer, and why Peko Dapcevic was kicked upstairs and relieved of all connection with the military, losing the title of General in the process. Western observers in Belgrade believe that, since the Soviet leaders do not go anywhere for simple discussions, the agenda for the conference was agreed to beforehand and that the announcements and declarations were written out in advance of the meeting.

2. Possible reasons for the Soviet move are as follows:

   a. Following the successful conclusion of the Austrian treaty, the USSR wished to give further evidence that its foreign policy has changed.

   b. The newly won confidence thus achieved will be used as a backdrop for selling the European security pact first announced in Berlin and revised at the recent Satellite conference in Warsaw. This pact will provide a means for settling the German problem to Soviet satisfaction. The Soviets seem to feel that they can get Yugoslav support of the security pact since the Yugoslav's non-attendance at the meeting was because of its timing, rather than on policy grounds.

S-E-C-R-E-T

50X1-HUM

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI		AEC					

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/28 : CIA-RDP80S01540R006600090043-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/28 : CIA-RDP80S01540R006600090043-9

c. The new Soviet move in Yugoslavia also affects the Satellites. Under the new order the Communist Parties will be considered equal. However, those who know the Soviets intimately are convinced that this Soviet move is designed to strengthen the Russian hand in the Satellites.

d. At the very least, the Soviets can throw sand in the gears of the virtually defunct Balkan Alliance, encourage Yugoslav opposition to Northern tier defense in the Middle East, and prod the Yugoslavs on to greater efforts in effecting a third force.

3. The Yugoslavs agreed to the visit because they want formal recognition of the wrongs committed in 1948 by Molotov and Stalin and reparations for the losses they received as a result of the economic blockade. They want the return of Yugoslav nationals held in Russia and the Satellites. The Yugoslavs would also like to expand their Eastern trade and settle their frontier problems with the Satellite states.

4. However, the Yugoslav Government is concerned over the openly expressed desire of the USSR for a rapprochement on the Party level. The Yugoslavs regard themselves as victims of Soviet aggression and resent the fact that the West does not accept this reasoning. It is not generally believed that Tito will go very far in normalizing Party relations. Rather, it is expected that he will stay in the middle of the road between the U.S. and the USSR.

5. When Khrushchev completed his speech at Zemun airport, he motioned Tito to come to the microphone and reply. Tito shook his head and motioned to the waiting cars. The Russians were obviously startled at Tito's failure to reply.

6. One Yugoslav official's comments on the Khrushchev speech were as follows:

a. It was rude to use Yugoslav soil for an attack on the U.S.

b. Khrushchev made a great mistake in using a ceremonial occasion for political propaganda. Belgrade dailies Borba and Politika engaged in serious discussion that night as to whether they should print the speech and only decided to do so because it had been broadcast.

c. It was annoying to have Khrushchev attempt to shift the emphasis of the meetings from the governmental to the Party level.

d. It was stupid of Khrushchev to make the reference to Beria, since the Yugoslavs are aware that he was not the only villain.

7. Another Yugoslav official commented on the Zemun speech as follows: The trouble is that the Russians believe in world revolution and we do not. We think that each nation should find its own solution to social problems. The working class in every nation has its own goals, and how they reach them is not the affair of the Soviets. If they show their goal is world revolution, then the West is justified in having a crusade against world Communism. We think that people should not ask for democracy in the USSR or for socialism in the U.S. We have no desire for ideological ties between Yugoslavia and the USSR any more

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/28 : CIA-RDP80S01540R006600090043-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/28 : CIA-RDP80S01540R006600090043-9

than we want ideological ties between Yugoslavia and the U.S. Our chief guiding point in these talks is that we will make no deals with the East which will harm our relations with the West. No step will be taken at the expense of our relations with the West.

8. The first item of business at the conference was Khrushchev's speech at Zemun Airport. Tito spoke of normalization on the governmental level while Khrushchev replied that he believed that normalization of Party relations must take place. The meeting has been described as "not a roundtable discussion but a confrontation."

9. It has become increasingly clear that the Soviet delegation arrived with a wrong assessment of the Yugoslav position. It is possible that Khrushchev in his speech of greeting thought that he was talking over Tito's head to Party members who might be still sympathetic to the Soviet Union, but if so, he was operating under an illusion. The Cominformists who have been released from jail are not overjoyed by this visit. They regard it as the possible destruction of their hopes for future return to power. Khrushchev's Zemun speech repudiated the Yugoslav Cominformists as agents of Beria.

10. The members of the Federation of Communists of Yugoslavia are nationalists, not internationalists, and socialist theories which do not satisfy their nationalist impulses are not acceptable to them. Khrushchev made the mistake of addressing them as if they were Cominformists, especially in making his bid for inter-Party unity. The net result is that any Yugoslav Communist who supports the Khrushchev speech can be automatically labelled a Cominformist. So far, Yugoslav Communists have had nothing good to say about the Zemun speech.

11. The Western Powers are not being provided with day to day information on the progress of the meetings, although the Yugoslavs give the impression that they prefer to keep the talks open. If matters proceed smoothly, the Western Ambassadors will be informed at the end. But if trouble develops, the Ambassadors may be consulted for recommendations. The Russians are opposed to extensive press coverage, but the Yugoslavs have done their best to extend it.

12. The position of Yugoslavia is now much better than it was prior to the 1948 break. The Cominform owes Yugoslavia $429,000,000 worth of goods from the time of the break, while the Yugoslavs failed to deliver $400,000,000 worth of goods to the Cominform. It seems that Tito will hold out for at least $500,000,000 damages from the USSR.

13. The Soviet delegation seems to be realizing that they misjudged the situation and that Yugoslavia will not return to the fold. They are now talking of inter-state relations, rather than Party relations. Meantime, the Yugoslav attitude is jubilant and self confident. They feel that the Soviet delegation still has a Stalinist attitude on Party and ideological matters, but that Khrushchev is hardly another Stalin. The Yugoslavs seem to feel that they are carrying the ball for the West at these talks in the sense that they are exploring the possibilities of making any substantial agreements with the USSR.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/28 : CIA-RDP80S01540R006600090043-9

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/28 : CIA-RDP80S01540R006600090043-9

14. The Russians have not been well received by the populace, and all the cheering was for Tito. By 28 May members of the Soviet delegation seemed to be in a subdued mood, and smiled during the formal reception only when it was unavoidable.

50X1-HUM

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/28 : CIA-RDP80S01540R006600090043-9